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Abstract  The control of infectious diseases has traditionally fallen to public health 
and the clinical care of chronic diseases to private medicine. In New York City, how-
ever, the Department of Health and Mental Hygiene (DOHMH) has recently sought to 
expand its responsibilities in the oversight and management of chronic-disease care. 
In December 2005, in an effort to control epidemic rates of diabetes, the DOHMH 
began implementing a bold new plan for increased disease surveillance through elec-
tronic, laboratory-based reporting of A1C test results (a robust measure of blood-
sugar levels). The controversy A1C reporting produced was relatively contained, but 
when Dr. Thomas Frieden, New York City health commissioner, called for the state 
to begin tracking viral loads and drug resistance among patients with HIV, both the 
medical community and a wider public took notice and have started to grapple with 
the meaning of expanded surveillance. In the context of the past century of medical 
surveillance in America, we analyze the current debates, focusing first on diabetes 
and then HIV. We identify the points of contention that arise from the city’s proposed 
blend of public health surveillance, disease management, and quality improvement 
and suggest an approach to balancing the measures’ perils and promises.
The control of infectious diseases has traditionally fallen to public health 
and the clinical care of chronic diseases to private medicine (Frieden 
2004). There has, however, never been a clear, consistent boundary 
between public health and medicine. Public health has, at times, assumed 
a duty to meet the needs of populations that have been inadequately served 
by the existing health care system. Debate about the duties and limits 
of public health have sporadically roiled the public health and medical 
communities over the course of the past century (Viseltear 1973). How 
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far should public health, as an agent of the state, reach into the clinical 
relationship? What are the appropriate bounds of public health?
In New York City, the health department has sought to answer these 
questions by seeking to expand its responsibilities in the oversight and 
management of chronic-disease care. As of 2003, diabetes had become 
one of the leading causes of death in the city and accounted for some 
twenty thousand hospitalizations (Bronza 2005). To control the epidemic, 
the New York City health department put forward a bold proposal for 
electronic, laboratory-based reporting of A1C test results, a robust mea-
sure of blood-sugar levels (Obesity, Fitness, and Wellness Week 2005; 
Santora 2005; New York City Department of Health and Mental Hygiene 
[DOHMH] 2005a: 3). On December 14, 2005, the eleven-member New 
York City Board of Health unanimously endorsed the health department’s 
surveillance plan, moving the city to the vanguard of chronic-disease 
management.
Never had a city government initiated an ongoing, systematic surveil-
lance of diabetes for an entire population (Stein 2005; DOHMH 2005a: 
4; Brewin 2005; D. K. Berger, medical director, Diabetes Prevention and 
Control Program, DOHMH, personal communication, January 27, 2006; 
M. Saynisch, director of electronic reporting, Division of Epidemiology, 
DOHMH, personal communication, January 27, 2006). Results are cur-
rently being drawn from the major labs in the city, which represent approx-
imately 90 percent of the A1C lab work done for patients, whether they 
receive only sporadic medical care or are in the regular care of a private 
physician, a private managed care plan, or a public program such as Med-
icaid or Medicare. Prior national and international governmental efforts 
to advance such initiatives have remained either voluntary or limited to 
key risk groups.1 The controversy A1C reporting produced was relatively 
contained, but when Dr. Thomas Frieden, commissioner of the New York 
City DOHMH, called for the state to begin tracking viral loads and drug 
resistance among patients with HIV, both the medical community and a 
wider public took notice and have started to grapple with the meaning of 
expanded surveillance. Frieden anticipated resistance and, speaking of 
his broader objectives, predicted that “some doctors, health care facilities, 
1. For examples of voluntary initiatives, see Spero, Kenet, and Porter (1998); Gudbjornsdot-
tir et al. (2003); Piwernetz (2001); Belgian Diabetes Registry (n.d.); Finnish Diabetes Associa-
tion (n.d.); James et al. (2004); MacLean et al. (2004); DOHMH (2005a: 3). For initiatives lim-
ited to key risk groups, see Desai et al. (2003); Saadine et al. (2002); Saydah (2004); Harwell 
et al. (2001); Miller, Safford, and Pogach (2004); Montiori et al. (2002); Acton et al. (2001); 
Juvenile Diabetes Research Foundation (2001); Thompson et al. (2005); Oregon Legislative 
Assembly (2001); State of Wyoming (2002).
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and organizations will oppose increased monitoring of treatment efficacy” 
(Frieden et al. 2005: 2401).
Frieden knew that more than privacy was at stake. Indeed, in the case of 
both diabetes and HIV, it has not been epidemiological monitoring of the 
disease or patterns of care that have raised objections. City health officials 
envision the new surveillance as the foundation for a system of providing 
feedback to both physician and patient with a focus on improving access to 
and supervising the quality and consistency of clinical care for these dis-
eases of public health significance (ibid.: 2399). Although health depart-
ments do administer clinical care programs for some populations and are 
responsible for quality assurance in various arenas, no health department 
has ever sought to exercise such thorough influence over care that it does 
not directly provide. In assuming this more assertive posture, the health 
department has raised concerns about the specter of undue intrusions into 
the clinical domain.
As we debate the responsibilities and limits of public health, it is impor-
tant to look back and consider the range of services that health depart-
ments have offered as health care providers, taking stock of how health 
officials’ aspirations have been both frustrated and realized. In the context 
of the past century of medical surveillance in America, we analyze the 
current debates — focusing first on diabetes and then HIV — identifying 
the points of contention that arise from this blend of public health surveil-
lance, disease management, and quality improvement.
Public Health Surveillance  
in Historical Perspective
In 2005, the New York City Department of Health and Mental Hygiene 
was described in the press as “break[ing] new ground” (Caruso 2005b) 
in seeking to collect data about diseases that are “neither contagious nor 
caused by an environmental toxin” (Stein 2005). Responding to New York 
City’s proposal, one Los Angeles County public health official observed, 
“Some people are uncomfortable with public health departments expand-
ing their scope beyond infectious diseases, but I would say we have to do 
it” (Caruso 2005a). The diabetes and HIV initiatives, however, do not her-
ald an entirely new trend extending the scope of public health surveillance 
to chronic conditions (Stein 2005). Nor do they raise new concerns about 
the limits of surveillance or, indeed, the limits of public health.
The practice of public health surveillance is Janus-faced. As a tool for 
identifying and locating individuals with disease, surveillance can be a 
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precursor for intruding upon the privacy and liberty of individuals with 
disease or at risk of disease. Yet surveillance is also essential for identi-
fying clusters, mapping the spread of disease, understanding patterns of 
contagion, and detecting lapses in hospital infection control. The identi-
fication of populations at particular risk of disease and death has often 
triggered the provision of ongoing services to those groups. Health clinics, 
vaccination programs, and milk stations are just a few of the examples 
of public health responses to the needs of vulnerable populations during 
the twentieth century. Health officials can act as licensed intruders, who 
enter infrequently into the spheres of home, business, and medical care; 
arrest contagion or contain hazards; and then withdraw. But they can also 
fill positive, nonconfrontational functions that are well integrated into 
the fabric of daily life. Indeed, the public has sometimes accepted, even 
demanded, that health departments assume roles akin to those of health 
care providers.
Since the late nineteenth century, disease surveillance has provided 
an opportunity to engage in case management or offer clinical or other 
services. For example, public health officials first initiated tuberculosis 
surveillance at a time when the illness represented a chronic infectious 
disease, eliciting strenuous objections from physicians who wanted to 
prevent health departments from interfering or intervening with their pri-
vate patients. Health officials accommodated physician demands and, in 
exchange for access to data, were willing to allow doctors to mediate 
access to their patients. Although at that time it was limited primarily to 
poor patients reliant on clinic care, the city was able to create its own vast 
system of sanitary supervision, with public health nurses making one-
quarter of a million visits to patient homes in 1910 alone (Billings 1912). 
To be sure, this network of surveillance could and did result in the invol-
untary isolation of tubercular patients whose disease was a threat to the 
community or who sought to avoid continual clinical monitoring. There 
is evidence that, as a consequence, some people sought to elude the reach 
of the health department (Abel 1997). A similar system of surveillance, 
in which health officials monitored the clinical care of patients over time 
and took on the management of those who lacked a private physician, 
was soon established for venereal diseases. Likewise, in the 1920s and 
1930s, health departments, in partnership with volunteer organizations 
such as the Elks Club and the National Foundation for Infantile Paralysis 
(the March of Dimes), began tracking crippled children and congenital 
malformations for the purpose of identifying children in need of services 
(Fairchild et al. forthcoming).
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In all of these instances, any punitive aspects of surveillance initia-
tives were by far outstripped by the ongoing care for which they allowed 
(ibid.). Although such surveillance systems could and often did provoke 
controversy, the debates were almost entirely between health profession-
als: patients were not engaged in them because both public health and 
medicine were highly authoritarian and paternalistic throughout the first 
half of the twentieth century. The patient was in the “caring custody” of 
the physician, and privacy was considered to be a right not of the patient 
but of “both physicians and patients” (Billings 1912: 12).2
Despite this early history, public health became increasingly divorced 
from clinical care (Brandt and Gardner 2000). In part, this was because of 
the rise of the hospital and health insurance plans. In large measure, how-
ever, it also represented a failure on the part of public health authorities to 
extend their vision to growing areas of need (Fee and Brown 2002). Health 
departments were reluctant to undertake surveillance for noninfectious 
or occupational diseases because these diseases did not seem to fit the 
intervention and treatment model that had been established in infectious- 
disease surveillance. For example, when state and local health depart-
ments began tracking cancers in the 1940s, such surveillance had the lim-
ited mission of developing incidence and prevalence data and therefore 
did not follow the clinical progress of patients over time (Reynolds 1993; 
Dorn 1949).
Medicine, however, did see the potential for surveillance to enhance 
patient care. From the 1920s to the 1950s, provider- and hospital-based 
tumor registries, for example, emphasized improvements in patient 
care (National Cancer Institute n.d.; Johnson 2005). A decade later, in 
the 1960s, health care quality assurance, or the assessment of medical 
records to determine the adequacy of medical care, began to become 
standard medical practice, inspired by industrial efforts to control and 
improve the quality of consumer products (Swift, Humphrey, and Gor 
2000). It also developed roots in federal agencies responsible for health. 
Quality assurance conducted by professional standards review organiza-
tions (PSROs) was one of the hallmarks of the provision of health care 
services under Medicare and Medicaid (Egdahl and Gertman 1976). By 
the 1970s, quality assurance had become integral to the management of 
medical care. As it evolved, quality assurance began to serve as both a tool 
for reacting to or even anticipating untoward health care events and as a 
2. The emphasis on physician rights and noninterference would persist and often be explic-
itly articulated. See Bowles (1920: 14) and Zimmer (1939: 229).
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proactive technique for regulating and improving the delivery of medical 
care (Gilpatrick 1999). Such data culling has involved not only private 
entities and clinicians but also federal and state agencies, including public 
health departments, that have maintained a role in health care provision. 
This type of oversight should not be confused with adverse or sentinel 
health care events that remain reportable largely on an institutional, vol-
untary basis in which hospitals and physicians are typically shielded from 
exposure (University of California at San Francisco, Stanford University 
Evidence-Based Practice Center 2001).
Thus, the state, most broadly construed, began to monitor and supervise 
the care that it funded and directly provided. Health departments also 
began to regain footholds in clinical territory. In the 1970s, responding 
in part to profound alterations in the health care milieu after the advent 
of Medicare and Medicaid, public health agencies became responsible for 
administering clinical service programs. New York City health commis-
sioner Lowell Bellin (1977) even expressed the belief that quality and cost 
control in the provision of health services generally would increasingly 
become one of health departments’ most essential functions.
While state health departments, the federal government, and private 
entities have used surveillance in similar ways and even collaborated over 
the course of the twentieth century, the public has often regarded state 
action very differently from private initiatives. Resistance to state action 
became a hallmark of the period after the 1960s and 1970s, as powerful 
rights-based social movements joined the fray and began to champion 
individual control over clinical decision making. Although medicine was 
the primary target of social change, public health initiatives, too, were 
questioned by the public in ways that they had not been during the first 
half of the twentieth century. As with medicine, this was particularly true 
in situations in which public health seemed to seek to override the judg-
ment of the individual about his or her behavior or medical treatment 
(Rothman 1991).
State immunization and birth defects registries, for example, have often 
been accompanied by some type of individual follow-up by public health 
agencies. In the case of immunization registries, this has typically taken 
the form of a mail or telephone reminder for parents regarding upcoming 
or overdue vaccinations. Birth defects surveillance, by the same token, has 
historically served as a gateway to educational, vocational, and medical 
services for disabled children. Both undertakings have been challenged 
over the course of the past thirty years. Based on concerns rooted in anti-
paternalism, parents have been able to demand opt-in requirements for 
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inclusion in a number of state immunization registries (Texas Department 
of State Health Services 2003). Grounded in the interest of privacy and as 
a reaction against the American history of coercive eugenics, alarm about 
stigmatizing children likewise led some states to develop mechanisms for 
allowing parents to either prevent reporting or remove identifying infor-
mation from congenital defects registries.3 To be sure, in most instances 
parents welcomed the services to which health departments directed them. 
However, in instances in which the health department neither provided nor 
funded clinical care services or in which its role vis-à-vis private practi-
tioners was unclear, its intervention could easily be viewed as crossing a 
bright line.
At the dawn of the twenty-first century, the boundary between public 
health and clinical medicine is being put to the test. In unfolding debates 
over diabetes and HIV surveillance, patients, their advocates, and con-
cerned citizens — echoing the arguments made by opponents of immu-
nization registries and birth defects reporting — have expressed concerns 
that the new surveillance is the first step on the road back to intrusive 
paternalism. Yet, as we have seen in this brief overview, health depart-
ments have been intimately involved in providing care to those they moni-
tor. This history requires us to distinguish paternalism — in a pejorative 
sense of the state overriding the judgment of the individual about his or 
her own health care — from providing for people, protecting the public 
welfare, and caring for the most vulnerable populations in society. Under 
one set of circumstances, surveillance represents burdensome scrutiny 
and amounts to a denial of privacy and choice; under another, it holds 
the promise of enhancing the prospects of access to appropriate care and 
expressing a commitment to social justice, a central moral norm for public 
health (Beauchamp 1976).
The Diabetes Debate
On July 13, 2005, with the fanfare of a new public health campaign, the 
New York City Department of Health and Mental Hygiene announced 
its proposal for electronic laboratory-based reporting of hemoglobin A1C 
tests for all city residents (Brewin 2005; Silver and Berger n.d.; DOHMH 
2005c: 8). According to the health department, approximately two hun-
dred thousand people who have diabetes in the city have not been diag-
3. For a thorough discussion of immunization and birth defects surveillance, see Fairchild 
et al. (forthcoming), chapters 6 and 7.
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nosed. In New York State, 31 percent of confirmed diabetic patients in 
commercial managed care and 42 percent in Medicaid managed care 
have an A1C indicative of “poor control” (DOHMH 2005a). Of those 
with diagnosed diabetes, 90 percent were unaware of their A1C levels (Sil-
ver and Berger n.d.).4 To Diana K. Berger, medical director of the city’s 
Diabetes Prevention and Control Program, this startling figure indicated 
that “Either doctors aren’t sharing that information with their patients, or 
they’re sharing it and their patients aren’t understanding it, or they’re shar-
ing it and the patients forget” (Jones 2005). Racial disparities in diabetes 
were also clear. The rate of diabetes is twice as high in non-Hispanic 
blacks as it is in whites in both New York City and the United States as a 
whole (Cowie et al. 2006; Fang et al. 1995). A1C levels in the South Bronx 
are particularly high (Grant et al. 2004).
In justifying the new surveillance initiative, the health department 
underscored its legal mandate to prevent and control chronic as well as 
communicable disease, citing cancer, dementia, and congenital malforma-
tions registries as providing well-established precedents for diabetes sur-
veillance (DOHMH 2005a: 2; Silver and Berger n.d.). For Frieden — who, 
since the beginning of his tenure as health commissioner in 2002, had 
sought to increase the capacity of the health department to gather, evalu-
ate, and act on information on the leading causes of death through commu-
nity health surveys, behavioral and risk factor surveys, and other existing 
data sources (T. Frieden, personal communication, March 6, 2006) — it 
was essential to adopt a lab-based reporting system in order to under-
stand “for the first time . . . the scope of the problem” (Goldman 2005). 
Thus, diabetes surveillance was deemed essential for program planning 
and outcomes assessment, which would enable the targeting of resources 
and development of programs to help health institutions, providers, and 
patients to control diabetes more efficiently (DOHMH 2005a: 3).
More radically, the health department proposed to use its authority to 
contact both doctors and patients when A1C levels suggested the need to 
review the clinical picture, facilitate diagnosis, and even modify the course 
of treatment (Osterweil 2005). In the 1990s, Frieden had been responsible 
for — first in New York and then in India — a “powerful” disease-management 
system that followed tuberculosis patients from diagnosis to cure and 
involved directly observed therapy (T. Frieden, personal communication, 
4. Thomas Frieden stated, “I can’t tell you what proportion of how many people are in poor 
control. Ninety percent don’t know themselves” (Goldman 2005). See also Osterweil (2005); 
Jones (2005); Urbina (2006).
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5. Data from the Web site of the American Diabetes Association at www.diabetes.org, cited 
by Beaulieu et al. (2003).
March 6, 2006). But the proposal was not simply the brainchild of an 
unusually proactive public health professional lacking precedent beyond 
Frieden’s experience in tuberculosis control. The move to address dia-
betes was also akin to a great many other measures taken within private 
health care delivery entities to systematize and improve chronic-disease 
management. Aware that his proposal could be viewed as an intrusion 
when undertaken by public health, Frieden carefully described the goal of 
the proposed diabetes system as serving to help physicians better manage 
their patients and “to empower patients with more information. It is not,” 
he stressed, “to interpose the Health Department between the doctor and 
the patient, in fact just the opposite; it’s meant to strengthen the doctors 
and their attempt to take care of the patients” (DOHMH 2005c: 6).
In principle, chronic disease – management programs primarily seek 
to promote and enable vigilance on the parts of both patients and provid-
ers, compelling the latter to implement what they theoretically already 
know and ensuring that the former learn and respond to what they should 
already have been taught, thus correcting for the failures of systems ori-
ented toward acute care as opposed to prevention or health maintenance 
(Bodenheimer, Wagner, and Grumbach 2002: 1775). In the case of dia-
betes, disease management has two functions: one is to improve patient 
lifestyle (e.g., to encourage patients to eat healthily and mindfully of blood 
sugar, exercise, and minimize stress), and the other is to assure appropri-
ate health care delivery (e.g., to make sure that patients have two hemo-
globin A1C blood tests per year, self-monitor blood sugar daily, test blood 
pressure yearly, test cholesterol, get eye and foot exams, and undergo drug 
treatment).5
Clinical information systems, which are generally widely available 
and routinely used, play a key role in streamlining disease management 
(Bodenheimer, Wagner, and Grumbach 2002: 1776). After a patient is 
diagnosed with diabetes and is entered into a computerized registry, tests 
such as measuring A1C and cholesterol levels can accumulate thereafter 
in the patient’s record. The registry can notify staff when data that is due 
to be entered is missing, alert them when recorded levels indicate poor 
diabetes control, and aggregate data to provide information about general 
population health and individual physicians’ performances (Bodenheimer, 
Wagner, and Grumbach 2002: 1776). The Vermont Diabetes Information 
System (VDIS) study, on which the New York City health department 
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relied heavily in advancing its diabetes surveillance initiative, used such a 
model to create its successful diabetes-management initiative (MacLean 
et al. 2004: 533).
New York City seized upon the Vermont study because the bounds 
within which it achieved its impressive results were regional rather than 
institutional: it supported the work of 121 providers in fifty-five clinical 
practice settings (ibid.: 538). Indeed, the Vermont investigators were con-
vinced that the successes of diabetes-management programs implemented 
“in staff-model managed care organizations with robust information sys-
tems,” which were already well documented, could be reproduced outside 
the managed care setting (ibid.: 533). Their effort evolved from a volu-
minous and growing literature that suggests that diabetes-management 
programs can keep the disease markedly more controlled in discrete 
populations (Montiori et al. 2002; Diabetes Control and Complications 
Trial Research Group 1993; U.K. Prospective Diabetes Study Group 
1998; Thompson et al. 2005; Bodenheimer, Wagner, and Grumbach 2002: 
1777 – 1778). Because the payoff is long term, insurance companies have 
not always been eager to invest in diabetes management. Medicaid and 
Medicare managed care plans, however, have leaped to implement such 
programs (Schmittdiel et al. 2005; Beaulieu et al. 2003; Leatherman et al. 
2003: 30; Mangione et al. 2006; Rittenhouse and Robinson 2006; Patric 
et al. 2006; Roohan et al. 2006).
New York City officials proposed to build on a well-established chronic 
disease-management model. Beginning with a Bronx-based pilot program, 
which it plans to roll out to the other boroughs, the city will communicate 
with providers about the implications of their patients’ A1C tests. The city 
will also develop its own capacities for helping patients gain self-man-
agement skills: the health department plans to pilot a program of diabe-
tes and nutrition education provided by certified diabetes educators and 
nutritionists in conjunction with the city’s existing “Shape Up New York” 
free physical fitness program, sponsored by the Department of Parks 
and Recreation. The crux of the initiative, however, is surveillance and 
clinical intervention. In moving this arm of the initiative forward, health 
department officials received encouragement as they consulted with orga-
nizations such as the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC); 
major city hospitals; clinicians throughout the city, particularly those 
practicing in the South Bronx, where the population is poor and diabetes 
rates are high; and patients with experience with disease-management 
technologies. National leaders of the American Diabetes Association 
(ADA) were likewise quite receptive to the notion of surveillance when 
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they were consulted by health department officials. Nathaniel Clark, the 
ADA’s vice president of clinical affairs, had helped to develop the Ver-
mont diabetes registry (DOHMH 2005a: 3). He felt strongly that registry 
efforts were particularly crucial for patients on the margins of the health 
care system — patients who had no ongoing relationship with a doctor and 
only sporadic medical care. It was appropriate for health departments to 
take responsibility when physicians or clinical care plans, including Med-
icaid and Medicaid managed care, let patients fall through the cracks.
Citizens, however, raised questions about the limits of health depart-
ment intervention. Its long leadership in infectious-disease control would 
make many citizens skeptical about its intentions in the chronic-disease 
arena in which it sought to monitor care that it was not necessarily provid-
ing. Thus, as the ADA reached out to its advocacy committee made up 
primarily of volunteers, profound privacy concerns surfaced. The ADA’s 
executive committee was subsequently convinced that it could only sup-
port A1C surveillance if patients gave consent at the time of each blood 
draw (N. Clark, ADA, personal communication, February 6, 2006). Like-
wise, in response to press coverage, a few from the city’s general public 
began to contact the health department asking for a patient opt-in provi-
sion (D. K. Berger, personal communication, January 27, 2006). Although 
the system might be identical to that used by their health care providers, 
patients did not regard the state with the same trust.
In response to initial concerns about stigma and discrimination (ibid.), 
Commissioner Frieden argued that the privacy protections for the reg-
istry would be stronger than those for communicable-disease reporting 
(DOHMH 2005c: 5).6 The notice of intention to amend the health code 
stated that “stringent confidentiality requirements . . . would prevent the 
sharing of diabetes diagnoses with anyone other than the patient or the 
treating medical providers” (DOHMH 2005a). Confidentiality provisions 
would explicitly prohibit information sharing that might “make it more 
difficult for persons with diabetes to obtain or renew a driver’s license, 
health insurance, life insurance, etc.” (ibid.: 3 – 4). Indeed, even patients 
themselves would not be able to authorize further disclosure of their reg-
istry data (Silver and Berger n.d.).
6. For other chronic and infectious conditions, such as congenital malformations, cancer, 
HIV, and tuberculosis, both New York City and New York State specify the conditions under 
which registry data may be released beyond the patient and his or her provider, and there are 
clear provisions for releasing data with patient consent (New York State Department of Health 
2004, 2005a, 2006a). See also NY Pub. Health Law §§ 2780 – 2787 (Consol. 2007), “HIV and 
AIDS Related Information”; NY Pub. Health Law § 2221, title II (Consol. 2007), “Control”; 
DOHMH (2005b: 13 – 14).
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Further, the department agreed to allow patients to opt out of the pro-
gram. Although it was not clear in the early stages of the controversy 
what that would entail, Frieden assured those who had come to testify at a 
public hearing that “anyone who doesn’t want to participate doesn’t have 
to, and procedures for not participating will be . . . similar to a do not call 
type registry, through e-mail, letter, with the Web, calling 311; making it 
very easy for people who never want to be a part of this, not to be part of 
it if they have diabetes” (DOHMH 2005c: 5; see also Goldman 2005). As 
Diana Berger later emphasized, any communication related to diabetes 
care that patients receive directly should come from their provider, not 
from the health department. Physician trust is also key. The health depart-
ment has no plans to penalize or publicly identify providers with poor 
track records for diabetes care (D. K. Berger, personal communication, 
October 23, 2006).
Slightly less than half of the ten individuals who offered oral testimony 
at the public hearing held on August 17, 2005 (some of whom were also 
represented among the forty written comments the department received) 
were mollified. It is, of course, difficult to know how representative those 
who come forward to testify are of the broader population. Nevertheless, 
it is crucial to understand how those most motivated sought to frame the 
debate. What is striking is that, without exception, those who objected 
to the new surveillance regime, most of whom were individuals unaffili-
ated with any advocacy organization, cited privacy concerns. A medical 
privacy attorney who explained that she, too, managed a chronic health 
condition, commented, “To me diabetes is a very private matter that would 
become a public matter” (DOHMH 2005c: 38).
It was not only that patients feared that the health department could not 
secure their records but also that the act of surveillance was itself stig-
matizing (ibid.: 49; see also DOHMH 2005c: 52; Goldman 2005). The 
proposed incursion on privacy was unacceptable to opponents because 
diabetes posed no communicable risk. One private patient who testified 
against the proposal stressed “that as a diabetic I am not a threat to the 
City’s public health, nor do I wish to be treated as one” (DOHMH 2005c: 
49). This view was echoed by the American Clinical Laboratory Asso-
ciation, which objected that the measure placed burdens on laboratories 
in the absence of a clear public health danger (P. M. Kazon, Alston and 
Bird LLP, letter on behalf of the American Clinical Laboratory Associa-
tion, August 16, 2005). An attorney described as representing health care 
groups concerned with medical privacy argued, “This isn’t smallpox. The 
state, or the city in this case, does not have a compelling interest in the 
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health of an individual that overrides that individual’s right to privacy” 
(Caruso 2005a; see also Osterweil 2005). Another individual likewise 
asked, “What gives New York City the right to take my private informa-
tion from me without my consent and usurp it as their own? Do I pose a 
bioterrorist threat? No. Is there some type of infectious disease threat? No. 
Is there an imminent threat that I will harm someone else? No” (DOHMH 
2005c: 38).
More profoundly, people feared that surveillance would enable the gov-
ernment to make decisions for them. One diabetic expressed his “desire as 
a private citizen to keep my personal medical information private between 
my physician and myself and nobody else” (ibid.: 49, 52). Diabetes regis-
tration could only open the door to a cascade of greater intrusions. “What 
is next?” one opponent asked. “Will New York City get the gynecologi-
cal records of every woman and put the ones who don’t use proper birth 
control on a registry too?” (ibid.: 40). She did not need or want the city 
to “babysit” for her (ibid.: 38). Likewise, one patient flatly rejected what 
he called a “Big Brother approach to diabetes management” (ibid.: 44). 
He shared the concerns of another who asked, “Are you going to demand 
what I can and can’t eat?” (anonymous, e-mail in DOHMH’s file of public 
responses, July 25, 2005). A city resident with diabetes summed up patient 
opposition when he told the health commissioner that “you’re sure as hell 
not my doctor”; “my diabetes is well controlled without your unasked-for 
paternalistic assistance and oversight” (anonymous, letter in DOHMH’s 
file of public responses, July 27, 2005). Twila Brase, a public health nurse 
who heads the Citizens’ Council on Health Care, an ideologically libertar-
ian “free-market health care policy organization” that played a key role in 
opposing mandatory immunization registries, birth defects surveillance, 
and a universal patient medical identifier in Minnesota (Brase 1998), com-
mented that “It’s a little creepy that it’s being done so undercover — in 
the laboratories — where it’s completely out of sight of the doctor-patient 
interaction” (Stein 2005). Diabetes, in short, should not be “managed by 
anyone other than the patient along with his or her health care team” 
(DOHMH 2005c: 45).
Some providers likewise found efforts to blur the boundaries of the 
patient-provider relationship alarming. Absent the need to protect others 
from harm, the proposed system was characterized as an unwarranted 
extension of public health authority into the domain of medicine (Caruso 
2005a; P. M. Kazon, letter on behalf of the American Clinical Laboratory 
Association, August 16, 2005). The Association of American Physicians 
and Surgeons (AAPS), an organization opposed to the “evil” of government- 
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based or “socialized” medicine (AAPS 1991), objected to lab-based A1C 
reporting as a “blatant invasion of patient privacy that will cause many 
patients to avoid testing and treatment” (A. Schlafly, general council, 
AAPS, letter to DOHMH, August 17, 2005). According to the AAPS, the 
plan would replace “individualized medical care with population-based 
medicine for patients having one of our nation’s most significant chronic 
diseases” (ibid.). Ironically, the AAPS, as well as the American Clinical 
Laboratory Association, cited Whalen v. Roe (429 U.S. 589 [1977]) — the 
landmark Supreme Court case in which surveillance was unanimously 
and forcefully upheld — to assert that the proposed blood sugar reporting 
system was unconstitutional (ibid.).7
In Whalen, patients and their doctors challenged a New York statute 
requiring physicians to report the names of patients who obtained pre-
scriptions for drugs with the potential for abuse such as barbiturates, 
tranquilizers, or amphetamines. The U. S. Supreme Court unanimously 
upheld reporting as “a reasonable exercise of the state’s broad police pow-
ers” (ibid.). Although the Court did, indeed, recognize a zone of medical 
privacy, it rejected the notion that any chink in the armor of privacy would 
threaten the clinical relationship. Disclosure of private patient information 
not only to the state health agencies but also to doctors, hospital personnel, 
and insurance companies might be “unpleasant,” but it was “an essential 
part of modern medical practice” even when such “disclosure may reflect 
unfavorably on the character of the patient” (ibid.). Critically, the Court 
gave its imprimatur to surveillance more generally, citing venereal dis-
ease, child abuse, deadly weapons injuries, and fetal death reports, includ-
ing abortion records, as “familiar examples” of legitimate public health 
reporting (ibid.).
Because of the threat of government interference, virtually all of those 
testifying against the proposed surveillance of diabetics advocated for opt-in 
or informed-consent procedures that would give individuals a choice up 
front about whether or not to participate. Opt-out provisions that left it up 
to the patient to take steps to remove his or her name from the registry, 
7. To resist intrusions on the private realm, the American Clinical Laboratory Association 
turned for authority to the case of Jacobson v. Massachusetts (197 U.S. 11 [1905]), which 
upheld the right of the state to require mandatory vaccination. The Liberty Coalition, which 
included the Association of American Physicians and Surgeons, the New York Republican 
Liberty Caucus, the National Lawyer’s Guild, Private Citizen Inc., the California Consumer 
Health Care Council, and the U.S. Bill of Rights Foundation, cited the case of the Unites States 
v. Westinghouse (638 F. 2d 570 [1980]), in which a U.S. district court upheld the right of the 
National Institute of Occupational Safety and Health to gain access to the medical records of 
workers in order to assess potential risks to their health.
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they maintained, were simply too difficult and failed to give individuals 
a meaningful choice (DOHMH 2005c: 42). A public-school principal in 
Harlem, speaking outside the context of the public hearing on the city’s 
diabetes initiative, stressed that while she welcomed the surveillance pro-
gram and the help it promised, it was essential to obtain patient consent: 
“There is enough privacy invasion already in our society” (Caruso 2005a; 
see also Caruso 2005b).
For advocates of diabetes surveillance, however, complete ascertain-
ment of cases was essential and a program that had to obtain consent 
would not be effective. Eran Bellin, Montefiore Medical Center’s director 
of outcomes analysis and decision support and son of the former New York 
City health commissioner who had written in favor of health department – 
based health-service quality improvement in 1977, was doubtless cogni-
zant of the ways in which informed-consent requirements threatened to 
compromise the scientific validity of public health data (Tu et al. 2004; 
Jacobsen et al. 1999). Although the program was not designed for 100 
percent ascertainment of all cases in the city, being limited to labs that 
were equipped to report cases electronically, Bellin challenged those who 
pressed for an opt-in approach, arguing that any such protocol would result 
in a “grossly inaccurate undercount” and was “tantamount to undoing the 
entire effort” (DOHMH 2005c: 25).
Although there certainly would be some cases in which surveillance 
and intervention would not produce patient improvements, the city stood 
to gain better disease management and improvements in the quality of 
care in the vast majority of instances, particularly for populations who 
would not yet have had access to this service at all. That diabetes control, 
in particular, has been identified as a priority area for quality improve-
ment both in the United States and internationally was reflected in the 
roster of physicians who advocated for lab-based A1C reporting at the 
public hearing in August 2005 (Adams and Corrigan 2003; Institute of 
Medicine 2001; MacLean et al. 2004; Istanbul Commitment 1999). Maria 
Pitaro, the associate medical director for Union Health Center, who tes-
tified in favor of the proposal, described herself as being in charge of 
quality improvement at her institution. She stressed that “what you don’t 
measure you can’t improve” (DOHMH 2005c: 13).8 Bellin underscored 
that the proposed initiative promised to replicate on a citywide basis the 
protocols that individual institutions had put into place to enable “our 
8. See also comments of Nellie Boma, medical director of Morrisania (DOHMH 2005c: 15); 
Steven A. Safyer, chief medical officer, Montefiore Medical Center, letter, August 11, 2005.
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quality improvement physicians to track patients across the system and 
across time” (ibid.: 20).
Patients who had experience with the Vermont system were also solic-
ited to show their support for such efforts. None of the Vermont partici-
pants who offered comments on the New York proposal felt that their 
privacy had been violated; all expressed confidence in registry security 
(anonymous authors, letters in DOHMH’s file of public responses, August 
12, 14, 15, 2005). Further, they underscored the direct benefits offered by 
disease management. One patient enrolled in the Vermont Diabetes Infor-
mation System argued that, because of registration, “I get letters from 
my doctor reminding me when to have my blood tests and helping me to 
decide what to do with the blood tests. This has been a very good service 
for me” (anonymous, letter in DOHMH’s file of public responses, August 
12, 2005). Another noted he had more than once been alerted when he had 
fallen behind in getting his A1C tests. “Thank goodness for this wonder-
ful program,” he wrote (anonymous, e-mail in DOHMH’s file of public 
responses, August 15, 2005). It is important to underscore, however, that 
the Vermont patients were praising a voluntary, practice-based diabetes 
registry. Their data was never shared with the state health officials. They 
expressed confidence in a system in which both they and their providers 
had agreed to participate as part of a research protocol. Thus, it is hard 
to say what their support portends about the acceptability of state-based 
surveillance.
The vast majority of physicians, likewise, drew little distinction between 
public health and managed care surveillance of diabetes and did not enter 
the fray. In this instance, it was not simply the case that medical organiza-
tions were not drawn into discussions about the proposed initiative: they 
did not respond when it became public. The Medical Society of the State 
of New York (MSSNY), while noting the new regime, offered no com-
ment on it (MSSNY 2005; Joseph 2005). The New York County Medical 
Society took no notice at the time.
The lack of physician involvement may be partially explained by the 
routine experience of third-party oversight with the rise of managed care. 
Whether they bristle at the requirements or not, doctors now view as unre-
markable the need to seek prior approval for or review of some of their 
clinical decisions. Outside of the private sector, Medicaid and Medicare 
and other publicly funded health care programs have given birth to gov-
ernmental agencies that have treated the kind of surveillance involved 
in quality assurance and improvement as central to the fulfillment of a 
fiduciary responsibility to taxpayers. Nonetheless, in historical perspec-
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tive, clinician quiescence is remarkable given that doctors and their pro-
fessional organizations have been among the most ardent opponents of 
public health reporting efforts for more than a century, particularly when 
it has involved any kind of interference with patients or their treatment. 
Historically, when physicians were prepared to yield care and oversight to 
health departments, it was typically with impoverished populations. It is 
not at all clear, then, whether physicians and their representatives would 
remain equally complacent if, for example, it was disease management 
for a disease that was not overwhelmingly viewed as a problem of poor, 
nonwhite populations.
From Diabetes to HIV
The diabetes measure was approved with remarkably little public contro-
versy and debate, and the health department yielded little ground. Offi-
cials have now made clear that patients will only be allowed to refuse 
interventions, such as letters alerting their physicians when tests are due 
or when A1C levels are too high. Critically, all data will be retained in 
the registry in identifiable form (D. K. Berger, personal communica-
tion, January 27, 2006). Discussion, however, did not come to a close. 
Indeed, it intensified in the wake of the measure’s passage. The American 
Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) — which had been so involved in debates 
about surveillance and privacy spawned during the past two decades by 
the AIDS epidemic, the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability 
Act (HIPAA), and bioterrorism — had been unaware of the proposal and 
hence missed the opportunity to comment at the public hearing.9 Its local 
affiliate has since begun to formulate plans for restraining the hand of 
public health (S. M. McGowan, ACLU, personal communication, March 
9, 2006). The New York City Council (2006), as part of its deliberations 
over the health department’s budget for fiscal year 2006 – 2007, expressed 
deep concerns about patient privacy, with some council members pressing 
for informed consent.
In part, the diabetes controversy was stoked by a rapidly heating debate 
over a subsequent city proposal to routinize HIV testing and create a simi-
9. In part, this was a consequence of the health department’s failure to reach out to those 
centrally concerned about privacy in the process of consultation. But it was also the case that 
both the New York City and national offices of the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) 
lacked staff focused specifically on medical privacy. Likewise, the groups who had engaged 
in the debates about HIV surveillance were not necessarily attuned to medical privacy more 
generally (J. Goldman, Health Privacy Project, personal communication, January 31, 2006).
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lar system of lab-based reporting for HIV viral loads and drug resistance. 
Indeed, it was in the midst of the effort to mandate lab-based diabetes 
surveillance that the New York City DOHMH revealed the discovery of 
a particularly virulent, drug-resistant strain of HIV. In February 2005, 
Commissioner Frieden announced that the department had identified a 
single individual who had rapidly progressed to full-blown AIDS within 
only twenty months of infection; the case was resistant to three classes of 
antiretroviral drugs despite never having been treated. Perhaps because 
the scientific community became roiled in debate about the wisdom or 
necessity of a public announcement based on a single case, Frieden’s call 
for the state health department to expand the scope of HIV surveillance 
by tracking viral load results as well as drug resistance initially drew little 
public attention (Santora and Altman 2005; Altman and Santora 2005; 
Altman 2005; MSSNY 2005; Joseph 2005).
The changes were justified by developments in testing techniques for 
lymphocyte and viral-load monitoring. The context was one in which 
remarkable strides in antiretroviral therapy since the mid-1990s had trans-
formed a diagnosis of HIV from a death sentence into a problem neces-
sitating chronic-disease management (Gostin, Ward, and Baker 1997). 
Combined with clinical presentation and other tests, newly available diag-
nostic tools provided a much more detailed picture of disease progression 
and prognosis (U.S. Food and Drug Administration 2005). Elevated viral 
levels or increased immune activity in the face of a particular antiretro-
viral therapy, for instance, could indicate a drug-resistant strain of HIV, 
lack of adherence to a treatment regimen, decreased absorption of drugs, 
physiological changes affecting drug metabolism, drug interactions, the 
impact of vaccinations, or the presence of other infections (Schalla et al. 
2001: 9).
Leaps had also been made in the realm of rapid HIV testing: in Novem-
ber 2002, the FDA approved the OraQuick HIV rapid test, which “pro-
vides results in 20 minutes, can be stored at room temperature, requires 
no special equipment, and can be performed outside clinical settings” 
(Janssen et al. 2003: 330). When the New York State Department of 
Health sent out its “2005 Guidance for HIV Counseling and Testing and 
New Laboratory Reporting Requirements,” bearing the news of the emer-
gency regulatory amendments regarding laboratory surveillance, it cited 
the OraQuick technology in justifying its expanded efforts. Rapid tests 
were a key reason, the state maintained, for “extending the reach of HIV 
testing” (New York State Department of Health 2005c). Not only did the 
CDC recommend making rapid testing more widely available, but it also 
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made clear that it would be revising its HIV testing guidelines and would 
soon recommend routine testing for the entire population, not just for spe-
cific risk groups (Branson et al. 2006). In a parallel move, Commissioner 
Frieden initially coupled his proposal for expanded surveillance with an 
ardent effort to eliminate New York’s pretest counseling requirement 
along with written informed consent for the test.
The two prongs of Frieden’s proposal — making HIV testing routine 
within the course of primary care and continuing to track viral loads once 
testing identified people with infection — each presented its own prom-
ise of benefit and basis for provocation. The support and opposition for 
the reporting initiative would reflect the long-standing debate about the 
appropriate uses of surveillance data in the context of the AIDS epidemic 
(Fairchild et al. forthcoming) and would expose in new ways divisions of 
race and class among those concerned.
On the surface, there was concordance between the city and the state 
on the surveillance initiative. In response to the changing clinical con-
text, the state began requiring laboratories to report detectable HIV viral-
load levels in 2000 (G. Birkhead, New York State Department of Health, 
AIDS Institute, e-mail to A. Fairchild, February 2, 2006). The city’s 
alert about the multidrug-resistant strain of HIV prompted the New York 
State Department of Health to require laboratories to report undetectable 
viral load results and antiviral drug resistance under emergency regula-
tions, which in 2006 were being prepared for publication and public com-
ment (New York State Department of Health 2005b). “As persons with 
HIV/AIDS live longer,” noted the state in expressing its intent to modify 
reporting procedures, “the authorized exchange of medical information is 
increasingly beneficial for coordination of medical care and other HIV-
related services” (ibid.: 16).
If, however, the state felt it was urgent to gain access to and exchange 
a broader array of data between public health and medicine, its intentions 
when it came to using the data could not have been more different from 
the city’s. It was “population-based data” on the “extent of resistance” 
that the state sought: “aggregate data will be extremely valuable to physi-
cians, providing them with information on the resistance patterns that will 
help guide HIV treatment practices” (ibid.: 17). While the state felt that 
it was critical to establish an “early warning system” for drug resistance 
with a particular focus on new cases (ibid.: 18), data could be used for 
epidemiological purposes only (G. Birkhead, e-mail, February 2, 2006; 
Santora 2006a).
Frieden, in sharp contrast, sought to use surveillance as a wedge for 
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direct intervention — monitoring trends in the epidemic and program 
planning would not be enough. A year after bringing the drug-resistant 
strain of HIV to public attention, Frieden framed his initiative as an effort 
to reach the most vulnerable individuals in the city, telling a New York 
Times reporter, “We know people are dying, and we are prohibited by law 
from lifting a finger to try and help” (Santora 2006a) in the same fash-
ion that “we are able to do . . . with every other communicable disease” 
(DOHMH 2006b; see also DOHMH 2006a; Osborne 2006). Of chief 
concern were patients lost to care, who had “no one responsible, no one 
accountable” for their medical management (T. Frieden, personal com-
munication, March 6, 2006). “If you’re black in New York,” said Frieden, 
“you’re three times more likely to have HIV and six times more likely 
to die from it. Not only is there a disparity in infection rates, but among 
those infected there’s a huge disparity in outcome” (Osborne 2006; see 
also Santora 2006b). These figures, said Frieden, represent “a damning 
indictment of our system” (Santora 2006a). Frieden meant not only to use 
epidemiological data to target testing and outreach but also to intervene 
when drug-resistant cases emerged and to work at preventing such strains 
by improving the care that diagnosed patients received more generally.
Some within the state took Frieden at his word, viewing the measure 
as an unwelcome critique of well-established programs (New York State 
Department of Health AIDS Institute, memorandum of concerns regard-
ing proposals to extend surveillance and intervention, n.d.). The New York 
State Department of Health’s AIDS Institute provides access to free health 
care to HIV-positive individuals through four programs: the AIDS Drug 
Assistance Program (ADAP) provides free medications; ADAP Plus pro-
vides primary care at a number of clinics, hospitals, and doctors’ offices; 
the HIV Home Care Program provides home care; and the ADAP Plus 
Continuation Program (APIC) provides payments to commercial health 
insurance plans on behalf of those who have lost their coverage because 
of inability to pay or losing a job (New York State Department of Health 
2006b). What could the city offer over and above these programs, which 
also include a well-established case-management system?
What the city proposed was a “comprehensive approach to improve 
prevention, diagnosis, treatment, case management, and epidemic con-
trol” (DOHMH 2006a). The health department circulated a bill among 
state legislators that explicitly sought “to enable local public health offi-
cials to use available information, or receive additional information, as 
necessary, to facilitate optimal care and linkages for HIV-positive per-
sons and their partners” (DOHMH n.d.b: 1, 3). Thus, the bill would have 
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allowed health officers to access all information on a patient’s history 
of antiretroviral treatment from health providers and facilities (DOHMH 
n.d.a: 1). It would, in addition, permit health officials to contact and share 
information with both the treating physician — “only after validation that 
the physician is the provider of HIV care” — and the patient (DOHMH 
2006c). For example, explained Frieden, when health officials become 
aware of a patient whose health is in danger unless treatment is modified, 
the city should be able to use the information already in hand and contact 
the patient and consult with his or her provider (Santora 2006a; Osborne 
2006; Straube 2006; DOHMH 2006b). The health department argued 
that it was uniquely positioned to refer newly diagnosed cases to care, 
contact patients directly if necessary, and help physicians locate patients 
who dropped out of care (T. Frieden, personal communication, March 6, 
2006; DOHMH 2006c).
A New York Times editorial (2006) gave a resounding endorsement to 
the city’s proposals. Underscoring the ways in which surveillance could 
be viewed as a protection rather than as a threatening intrusion, the Times 
argued that “surely most patients would rather get life-extending treat-
ments than languish in neglect.” The Latino Commission on AIDS (2006) 
was similarly supportive, viewing expanded monitoring as representing 
a “third pair of eyes” that promised to benefit minority patients in New 
York City. The health department impanelled a twenty-one-member com-
mission on HIV/AIDS to make recommendations on prevention, treat-
ment, and care. This commission, which included representatives from 
such diverse organizations as the National Black Leadership Coalition on 
AIDS, Harlem Director’s Group, Medius Institute for Gay Men’s Health, 
and Gay Men’s Health Crisis, endorsed proposed changes in laboratory 
reporting to the state and city. It stopped short, however, of recommending 
the use of such data on a “patient-specific basis” in the absence of further 
evaluation (New York City Commission on HIV/AIDS 2005: 29, 35).
Those skeptical of the plan attempted to separate the issues that were 
merged in Frieden’s concept of the health department’s role. Epidemio-
logical monitoring of trends in the spread of disease, quality of care, and 
access to care were essential; direct supervision of infected individuals or 
their doctors was both unnecessary and unacceptable. Ronald Johnson of 
the Gay Men’s Health Crisis also underscored issues of access that charac-
terized the minority experience with the health care system when he com-
mented that the issue for African American gay men is not that of falling 
through the cracks once they receive care but that of even getting into 
the system for an initial test (Straube 2006). For other groups, opposition 
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was grounded in arguments about limited resources. The AIDS Coali-
tion to Unleash Power (ACT UP) questioned the financial logic behind 
investing in individual disease management, grounding its opposition in 
the diversion of “scarce resources from effective HIV prevention efforts” 
(M. K. Swirsky, ACT UP, letter concerning May 19, 2005, draft report 
by New York City Commission on HIV/AIDS, June 10, 2005). Likewise, 
the New York AIDS Coalition (2005a) — an alliance of community-based 
organizations — and, indeed, some within the New York State Depart-
ment of Health’s AIDS Institute questioned whether these efforts would 
merely duplicate the existing case-management system (New York AIDS 
Coalition 2005b; New York State Department of Health AIDS Institute, 
memorandum of concerns regarding proposals to extend surveillance and 
intervention, n.d.). Others, however, downplayed issues of race, class, or 
resources. Housing Works, another AIDS advocacy group that framed 
its opposition in broader philosophical terms, asserted that “the very fact 
that lab work is being done demonstrates that the patient is already in the 
care of a healthcare provider licensed by the State of New York” (Cordero 
2006).
Worries about paternalism continued to remain central. The public 
policy director for Housing Works — which emerged as the foremost 
opponent in the attack on the new surveillance — expressed concern about 
health officials making contact with a patient’s health care provider with-
out consent or perhaps second-guessing the doctor (Santora 2006a; New 
York Times 2006). Testifying before the U.S. Presidential Advisory Coun-
cil on HIV/AIDS, Housing Works, in language that echoed the oppo-
sition to the diabetes surveillance initiative, spoke out against the city 
plan “to interfere in the doctor-patient relationship of people living with 
HIV/AIDS” (Housing Works 2006). Said one of the group’s community 
organizers, “Receiving a call from an unknown bureaucrat questioning 
the quality of my care and the decisions that my doctor and I are making 
about my treatment” represents nothing more than “Big Brother watching 
over our shoulder” (ibid.; see also Cordero 2006; New York AIDS Coali-
tion 2005b).
As was true in the response to proposals for diabetes surveillance, some 
activists feared a slippery slope of intervention and saw the potential for 
expanded surveillance to take on far more coercive dimensions. “How this 
information could be used to sanction patients or clinical providers who 
don’t comply with the wishes of public health officials is a serious question 
that must be explored,” insisted the New York AIDS Coalition (2005b). 
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“Perhaps in the beginning the intrusion will only be advisory. But who 
knows what future use of this power of intrusion might be put to,” cautioned 
one advocate. “Am I going to be coerced into treatment, or sanctioned 
for being non-adherent?” (Housing Works 2006). ACT UP expressed 
similar concerns, although without the bristling anger that character-
ized its response to surveillance in earlier periods: “We question the . . . 
coercive, even if ostensibly benign, state interventions to control the epi-
demic” (M. Swirsky, letter, May 19, 2005). Although activists recognized 
that government had become more willing and able to support persons 
with AIDS in its efforts to stem the spread of the disease, they vividly 
remembered a time not long ago when being identified to authorities as 
HIV positive brought only the threat of exposure and stigmatization and 
no promise of protection or assistance. They remained hesitant to sanction 
Frieden’s assertion that only public health oversight could create the syn-
ergy necessary for officials to meet need where it was greatest and avert 
future crises of contagion.
In response to concerns about paternalism and coercion, the health 
department expressed a commitment to use a consent or opt-in model for 
the purposes of using surveillance data to link individuals to care (DOHMH 
n.d.a, n.d.b). As in the case of diabetes, individual data would remain part of 
the registry. Although the details about how consent would be implemented 
remained unclear at a juncture at which health officials continued to modify 
the bill prior to ultimately withdrawing it, an opt-in model seemed likely. In 
other words, it appeared that individuals would not be included in disease- 
management efforts until they agreed — as opposed to the situation in dia-
betes where they would be required to take the initiative on their own, 
perhaps only after they had been subject to the intervention.
In addition, the health department was compelled to treat the issue 
of direct patient intervention with special care. In a letter to community 
members, Commissioner Frieden explained, “We would reach out to treat-
ing doctors, case managers and, only if there are no viable alternatives, 
directly to patients to offer to help link them to existing HIV services” 
(T. Frieden, letter to community, March 6, 2006; emphasis in original). 
Although taking a softer stance on direct intervention, Frieden nonethe-
less continued to underscore the imperative for change, arguing that “the 
epidemic demands new and effective approaches to reach patients who are 
not in care” (ibid.).
As the city anticipated the September 2006 release of the new CDC 
guidelines that would recommend routine HIV testing and as leading 
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ethicists in the region described the surveillance plan as “half baked,”10 
the city health department made a strategic decision to retreat from an 
expanded surveillance system. It chose to focus its efforts instead on 
eliminating written informed consent for HIV testing, but even here it 
faced resistance. The New York State legislature has proved reluctant to 
reconsider its nearly ten-year-old, exacting informed-consent law. Given 
the progress already made in diabetes surveillance, however, the question 
of expanded, more vigorous HIV surveillance will certainly recur. Indeed, 
Commissioner Frieden has suggested other areas, such as colon cancer, in 
which we might see future efforts on the part of public health to contribute 
to clinical care (Frieden 2004). The prospect of joining public health sur-
veillance with disease management and quality improvement for a chronic 
condition demands that we confront old questions about the appropriate 
bounds of public health in the context of a transformed but still profoundly 
fragmented health care delivery system.
Conclusion: Beyond Privacy,  
Beyond Surveillance
The recent politics of disease surveillance in New York City help to illumi-
nate when and under what circumstances disease surveillance can break 
free of a historical division between public health and medicine. The irony 
is that the city made headway not with infectious diseases, an area in 
which it has traditionally enjoyed greatest authority, but with chronic dis-
eases. The diabetes measure moved forward whereas a virtually identical 
proposal for the most significant infectious threat faced by the city was, at 
least for the time being, tabled in order to pursue the pressing policy prior-
ity of routinizing HIV testing. In both instances, the disease-management 
systems for which the health department advocated already existed in both 
private- and public-sector health care. In both instances, opponents of 
public health surveillance feared the slippery slope of government inter-
ference. In the instance of HIV, however, those fears held more traction. 
A better-organized community, with a long memory of threats of coercion 
involving those harboring the infection, effectively thwarted more aggres-
sive surveillance.
10. A sentiment expressed at “HIV Testing and Surveillance: Time for a Change?” a meeting 
funded by the American Foundation for AIDS Research and sponsored by the Center for the 
History and Ethics of Public Health in the Department of Sociomedical Sciences, Columbia 
University, Mailman School of Public Health, May 2, 2006.
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In both instances, the specter of a malignant paternalism was raised. In 
the HIV debates, the specter of paternalism invited concerns about undue 
intrusions in the lives of those made vulnerable not only by disease but 
also by race and class and has threatened to obscure the fact that the new 
measures are far less about deciding for people and far more about provid-
ing for them. Indeed, it was the unmet need of marginalized populations 
that called forth the public health effort to fill a yawning gap.
As we have shown, private actors — particularly in the field of diabetes 
care — have already crossed the surveillance threshold and challenged the 
dyadic doctor-patient model of care without raising the specter of “Big 
Brother in his civilian clothes” (Brenton 1964: 12; see also p. 13).11 In 
large measure this is because a patient’s providers have agreed to this kind 
of supervision by participating in different insurance or managed care 
plans. Health officials, then, face the unique challenges of acknowledging 
the threat that state-based surveillance poses and specifying how it will 
limit government interventions while also making the case for the poten-
tial promise of public health oversight and intervention.
There is ample evidence that access to health care has a significant 
impact on successful diabetes control (Orr and Boyages 2005). The abil-
ity of quality improvement and case-management efforts to reduce racial 
disparities in A1C levels — a tall and complicated order — has yet to be 
demonstrated (Sequist et al. 2006). Thus, it remains to be seen whether 
the city health department’s efforts at diabetes surveillance will be effec-
tive in overcoming the existing barriers to health care, particularly in low-
income areas such as the South Bronx. Likewise, if the city’s thwarted 
system of HIV surveillance is able to overcome political obstacles, it will 
confront similar implementation barriers.
We should not measure the impact of diabetes, HIV, or any chronic-
disease surveillance effort only in empirical terms, however. The most 
difficult question regards a moral and political decision about the role 
and responsibility of public health. Mirroring the debates that have taken 
place within public health since the 1930s,12 some in public health ques-
tion not only whether health officials can successfully take on the chal-
lenge of clinical disease management but also whether they should (New 
York AIDS Coalition 2005b; New York State Department of Health AIDS 
Institute, memorandum of concerns regarding proposals to extend surveil-
11. Brenton made this charge during a period of increased popular anxiety about both gov-
ernment surveillance and unauthorized commercial surveillance.
12. See, for example, Brandt and Gardner (2000); Fee (1987: 227 – 236); Colgrove (forth-
coming); Fairchild et al. (forthcoming).
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lance and intervention, n.d.). At stake is not just a new model of chronic-
disease surveillance in which it is necessary to balance individual privacy 
and autonomy against the greater good but also the recurrence of a persis-
tent question about the mandate of public health.
Even if it cannot eliminate racial disparities in chronic diseases to the 
extent that it becomes a force for improving access to health care, public 
health serves the larger end of social justice. Even in the absence of a 
disease-management component, truly comprehensive public health sur-
veillance could reveal not only the shortcomings of individual doctors but 
also much larger ethnic and class disparities that are symptomatic of our 
highly segmented health care delivery system. To the extent that private 
or publicly funded programs like Medicaid and Medicare managed care 
do not fulfill their mission, surveillance represents both a source of epide-
miological data and a kind of social vigilance keeping our failures on the 
political radar. Even if it cannot correct the failures in our health care sys-
tem, extending public health surveillance to chronic diseases represents 
an important step in the realization of social justice. Commercial inter-
ests have already begun to make the most of surveillance data, although 
largely because of cost savings. If public health is to advance its “historic 
dream . . . of social justice” (Beauchamp 1976: 6), it is time to take a step 
back and look ahead.
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